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Abstract
The rate of return earned on a deposit can depend on its term, the amount of money
invested in it, or both. Most banks, for example, offer a higher interest rate for longer
term deposits. This implies that if one individual has capital available for investment
now, but needs it in the next period, whereas the opposite holds for another individual,
then they can both beneﬁt from cooperation since it allows them to invest in a longer
term deposit. A similar situation arises when the rate of return on a deposit depends on
the amount of capital invested in it. Although the beneﬁts of such cooperative behavior
may seem obvious to all individuals, the actual participation of an individualdepends on
what part of the revenues he eventually receives. The allocation of the jointly earned
beneﬁts to the investors thus plays an important part in the stability of the cooperation.
Thispaper providesa game theoreticalanalysis ofthisallocationproblem. Several classes
of corresponding deposit games are introduced. For each class, necessary conditions for
anonemptycoreareprovided,andallocationrulesthatyieldcore-allocationsareexamined.
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1CentER for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153,
5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands
2Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona, Diagonal 690, Barcelona, 08034, Spain.1 Introduction
During their lives, people save part of their income so as to better deal with any (unforeseen)
expenses in the future. These savings can be deposited at a bank to obtain some additional
earnings. Depending on the type of deposit, the rate of return earned on it can depend on the
amount of money invested, the term of the deposit, or both.
Deposit banks, for example, usually pay a higher interest rate when the term of the
deposit increases. This impliesthat one wouldprefer long termdeposits to short termdeposits.
However, long term deposits are less liquid so that future consumption needs may prevent
an individual from investing in a long term deposit. The ideal deposit would thus be the
one that earns the interest of a long term deposit and possesses the liquidity of a short term
deposit. Though no deposit bank offers such deposits, they are not completely out of this
world. Consider, for instance, two individuals, one having $1000 to invest for this year only
and one having $1000 to invest for the subsequent year only. Furthermore, suppose that one-
year deposits earn4% interest per year and that two-year deposits earn 6% per year. Then each
person individually can invest $1000 in a one-year deposit only, earning $40 interest. Now,
if they pool their savings, they have $1000 available for the next two years. Investing in a
two-year deposit then earns them $120, which exceeds the earnings of two one-year deposits.
Moreover, each individual maintains his desired level of liquidity (see also DIAMOND and
DYBVIG, 1983).
In this paper we study how cooperation between individuals can lead to higher returns
on deposits. We consider a ﬁnite time horizon consisting of a number of periods during
which individuals have certain amounts of money available for depositing. There is a number
of deposits available, each of which generates revenues that may depend on the term of the
deposit ortheamountofmoney invested in it. Inthistypeof situations, thefollowingissuesare
prominent. First, what is the optimal strategy, i.e. how should the money optimally be divided
over the different available deposits, and, second, what division of the revenues is considered
to be acceptable to all cooperating individuals?
2Determining the optimal strategy is a combinatorial optimization problem: what com-
bination of deposits earns the highest beneﬁts given the amount of money that the individuals
have available for such deposits. This optimization problem, however, is not the main issue
of this paper. Instead, we mainly focus on the allocation problem. Although individuals may
recognize the beneﬁts of cooperation when depositing their savings, it does not necessarily
imply that they are also willing to participate in such a cooperation. The participation of each
individualdepends, amongst otherthings, on what sharein therevenuesheeventuallyreceives.
In thisregard,the allocationof therevenues playsan importantrolein establishing an enduring
and stable cooperation.
To tackle this allocation problem we turn to cooperative game theory. We model the
situation as a cooperative game, called a deposit game. In a deposit game, the value of
cooperation for a coalition equals the maximal revenue that this group can obtain by pooling
their individualsavings. In particular,our attentiongoes out to stability conditionsof thegrand
coalition in which all individuals cooperate. We therefore examine balancedness of deposit
games. Inparticular,we look for(simple) allocationrules toobtaincore-allocations. We focus
on three special subclasses of deposit games. Each subclass is characterized by properties of
the revenue function, that is, how the revenue generated by a deposit depends on the term and
the amount of capital of this deposit.
For the ﬁrst subclass, called termdependent deposit games, the rateofreturn of adeposit
dependsonitsterm,butnotontheamountofcapitalinvestedinit. Weshowthattermdependent
deposit games are (totally) balanced and the other way around, that is each nonnegative totally
balanced cooperative game can be written as a term dependent deposit game. Furthermore,
we show how to obtain particular core-allocations by constructing Owen-vectors (cf. OWEN
(1975)).
For the second subclass of capital dependent deposit games, the yearly rate of return of
a deposit depends on the amount of capital invested in it, but not on the length of its term. The
revenue of such a deposit is thereforeadditive over time. The capital dependent deposit games
are an extension of games that were ﬁrst introduced in LEMAIRE (1983), and further analyzed
3in IZQUIERDO and RAFELS (1996). As opposed to our model, the latter only considers a time
span of one period. We show that capital dependent deposit games are (totally) balanced if the
revenue per unit of capital is increasing in the amount of capital invested. Furthermore, we
show that in that case the proportional rule results in a core-allocation.
For the third and ﬁnal class of ﬁxed term deposit games, the revenue of a deposit is
positive only if the term covers the whole time horizon that is under consideration. Hence, the
name ﬁxed term deposit game. We show that the class of ﬁxed term deposit games contains
the class of term dependent deposit games. Moreover, we show that ﬁxed term deposit games
are balanced if the rate of return is increasing in the amount of capital, and furthermore, that
some speciﬁc class of proportional-likerules yields core-allocations.
Our results show that proportional-like allocation rules perform remarkably well when
consideringstability ofcooperation. This isparticularlyinterestingsinceit iscommonpractice
for investment funds to allocate revenues in a proportional way: each participant of the
investment fund obtains the same rate of return, irrespective of the amount of capital he
contributed to the fund.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces deposit games and shows that
they need not be balanced. Sections 3 through 5 analyze term dependent, capital dependent,
and ﬁxed term deposit games, respectively. Attention is focused on balancedness issues and
the construction of allocation rules leading to core elements. Finally, it needs to be mentioned
that all proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Deposit Games
Consider a group of individuals, each having amounts of money available for depositing at a
bank during  time periods. Let N denote the set of individuals and let !i 2 IR

+ describe
individual i’s endowment of money over time, i.e., !i
t is the amount of money available to
individual i in period t.
A deposit is described by a ﬁxed amount of capital c and a consecutive number of
4periods t1;t 1+1;:::;t 2with 1  t1  t2  , in which the amount c is deposited in the bank.
T = ft1;t 1+1 ;:::;t 2gis called the term of this deposit. Let
T =
n
T f 1 ;2 ;:::;g
 
9 t 1;t22f1;2;:::;g : T = ft1;t 1+1 ;:::;t 2g
o





+ j9c0 9T2T : d = ceT
o
denote the set of all possible deposits in  periods where (eT)t =1if and only if t 2 T.G i v e n
a deposit d = ceT 2 D, dt is the amount of capital deposited in period t and it equals c if
t 2 T, and zero otherwise. Each deposit that is made in a bank yields a certain revenue. In
this regard one can think of interest that is paid by the bank in each period for the duration of
the deposit. Let R : D ! IR + denote the revenue function that assigns to each deposit d 2 D
a revenue R(d). Furthermore, assume that the zero deposit pays zero revenue, i.e. R(0) = 0.
Depending on thestructureof therevenuefunction,and on theindividuals’endowments,
they may be able to obtain higher returns on deposits by pooling their money. We therefore
deﬁne a deposit game, which is a cooperative game where the value of a coalition is given by
the maximal revenue this coalition can obtain by depositing their available money in the bank.
Let S  N, then !(S)=
P
i 2 S! idescribes the total amount of money availablefor depositing
in each period to coalition S. A collection d1;d 2;:::d m of deposits is feasible for coalition
S if they have the money to make these deposits, that is,
Pm
k=1 dk  !(S). The total revenue
then equals
Pm
















is denoted by DGN. From the deﬁnition of the game it follows that deposit games are
superadditive. For if twodisjoint coalitionsmerge, they can at least makethedeposits they can
make separately, earning at least the revenues they can obtain separately.
1Given the nature of the problem we are considering, this assumption is justiﬁed. For if the supremum would
not exist, a coalition could obtain unlimited revenues with a limited amount of money. Realistically, this is not
considered to be possible.
5Once individuals cooperate, they also have to divide the beneﬁts that emerge from
cooperation. The question that arises in this regard is what distributions are ‘fair’. In most
cases, a core-allocationis considered to be fair. A core-allocation divides the beneﬁts v(N) of
the grand coalition N in such a way that no coalition S has an incentive to part company with
the grand coalition N and decide on her own what deposits to make. The next example shows
that the core of a deposit game can be empty.
Example 2.1 Consider the following three-person deposit game with a one period time span.
So, let  =1 ,N=f 1 ;2 ;3 gand let !i = 500 for i =1 ;2 ;3 . Next, suppose that the agents can
only deposit their money in a one year bond of $1;000 paying 4% interest. Then the revenue
of one such a bond equals $40. The revenue function R :I R +!IR thus equals R(d)=4 0 
with  the number of bonds that one can buy with d dollars.
Since individual i cannot buy any bonds, we have that v(fig)=0 . Two individuals
on the other hand, possess !i + !j =1 ; 000 so that they can invest their money in exactly
one bond. Hence, v(fi;jg)=4 0for i;j 2 N with i 6= j. The grand coalition N possesses
!1 + !2 + !3 =1 ;500. Since this enables them to invest in exactly one bond, it holds that
v(N)=4 0 .
Thecoreofthisgameisempty .Forxtobeacore-allocationitmustholdthatx1+x2  40,
x1+x3  40,a n dx 2+x 340. Addingthethreeinequalitiesyieldsthat2(x1+x2+x3)  120.
Since x1 + x2 + x3 =4 0=v ( N )we obtain the contradiction 80  120. Hence, the core of
this game is empty.
In order to obtain balancedness for deposit games we need to impose some additional
restrictions on the revenue function R : D ! IR +. In the remainder of this paper we focus on
three subclasses of deposit games, each of which is characterized by properties of the revenue
function.
For the ﬁrst class under consideration, the rate of return of a deposit depends on its term,
butnoton theamountofcapital invested init. Incasetherevenueconsistsof interestpayments,
this means that the interest rate is independent of the amount of capital deposited. We refer to
6this class of games as term dependent deposit games.
Thesecond class underconsideration isthecounterpartoftheﬁrstone, which meansthat
the yearly rate of return of a deposit depends on the amount of capital invested in it, but not on
the length of its term. We refer to this class of games as capital dependent deposit games.
Finally, for the third class the revenue function is such that only deposits with a ﬁxed
termof  periodsyieldastrictly positiverevenue. Therefore, wereferto thisclass asﬁxed term
deposit games. Note that in this case the rate of return can depend on the amount of capital
deposited.
3 Term Dependent Deposit Games
For term dependent deposit games, the rate of return of a deposit depends on its term, but not
on the amount of capital deposited in it. Mathematically, this means that the revenue R(d) of
a deposit d is linear in the amount of capital c deposited, i.e.
R(d)=R(d); (1)
for all   0 and all d 2 D.
The class of all term dependent deposit games with agent set N is denoted by TDG N.
Note that TDG N DGN.
WedenotebyBAN and TOBA N theclass ofall balanced gamesand all totallybalanced
games,respectively. Inparticular,TOBA N
+denotestheclassofallnonnegativetotallybalanced
games. The next theorem shows that term dependent deposit games are totally balanced.
Theorem 3.1 Each term dependent deposit game is totally balanced.
Theorem 3.1 states that TDG N TOBA N
+. The reverse of this statement also holds,
that is, every nonnegative totally balanced game can be written as a term dependent deposit
game.
7Theorem 3.2 A nonnegative cooperative game is totally balanced if and only if it is a term
dependent deposit game.
Since term dependent deposit games are totally balanced and nonnegative, they can be
formulatedin termsoflinear productiongames(seeOWEN, 1975). This enablesus to construct
acore-allocationbymeansofanOwen-vector. Forthispurpose,deﬁnep 2 IR
# T , A 2 IR   # T ,
and bi 2 IR




























for each S  N. In terms of linear production games, the endowments of the agents serve as
the resources and the goods they can produce are deposits. Since R(d)=R(d) we have
that R(cTeT)=c TR ( e T)for all cT  0.S o , c Trepresents the quantity that is produced of
deposit eT. One unit of a deposit eT yields a revenue of R(eT). Thus the price at which one
unit of the deposit eT can be sold is set at pT = R(eT).















Now, if(^ y1;^ y2;:::;^ y )is anoptimal solutionof thisminimizationproblem,thenthe allocation
x 2 IR
N with xi =
P
t=1 !i
t^ yt for all i 2 N is a core-allocation for the corresponding term
dependent deposit game.
Let us illustrate this procedure with the following example.
Example 3.3 Consider the following two-period situation with two individuals. Let !1 =
(1500;0) and !2 =( 0 ; 1000).S i n c e  =2we have that T = ff1g;f2g;f1;2gg.N o w
suppose that a one year deposit in period 1 or 2 yields a revenue of 4%, and a two year deposit
yields a revenue of 12%,i . e .R ( e f 1 g)=R ( e f 2 g)=0 : 04,a n dR ( e f 1 ; 2 g)=0 : 12.
8The corresponding term dependent deposit game (N;v) is given by v(f1g)=6 0 ,
v ( f 2 g )=4 0 ,a n dv ( f 1 ; 2 g ) = 120 + 20 = 140.B y t a k i n g p =( 0 : 04;0:04;0:12), b1 =










we also have that v(S)=m a x f p >c j c0 ;Ac
P
i2Sb ig, for all S  N. An Owen-vector is
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:
Theoptimalsolutionofthelatterminimizationproblemis ^ y =( 0 : 04;0:08). Thecorresponding
Owen-vector(^ y>b1;^ y>b2)equals(60;80) andbelongstothecoreofthetermdependentdeposit
game (N;v).
4 Capital Dependent Deposit Games
For the second subclass we consider deposits for which the yearly rate of return is independent




R ( ceftg) (2)
for all T 2T and all c  0. A deposit game with revenue function that satisﬁes expression (2)
is called a capital dependent deposit game and the class of capital dependent deposit games is
denoted by CDGN. Note that if  =1we obtain the model of ﬁnancial games as introduced
in LEMAIRE (1983) and further analyzed in IZQUIERDO and RAFELS (1996).
9Capital dependent deposit games need not be balanced. In fact, the deposit game of
Example 2.1 is a capital dependent deposit game with an empty core. The following theorem
gives a sufﬁcient condition for totally balancedness.
Theorem 4.1 If
R(ceftg)
c is increasing in c on (0;1) for all t 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;g, then the corre-
sponding capital dependent deposit game (N;v) is totally balanced.








for all i 2 N, belongs to the core of the capital dependent deposit game. Note that this
proportionalrulecan easily beextended to a population monotonicallocation scheme. For this










for all i 2 S and all S  N.
Contrary to term dependent deposit games, not every nonnegative totally balanced game
is a capital dependent deposit game, as the following example shows.
Example 4.2 Remember that, for each T  N, the unanimity game (N;uT) is deﬁned as
follows
uT(S)= 1 ;if T  S;
=0 ; otherwise.
(3)
Now consider the simple game (N;v) with N = f1;2;3;4;5;6g and minimal winning coali-
tions f1;2;3;4g and f1;2;5;6g, so that v(S)=u f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 g ( S )+u f 1 ; 2 ; 5 ; 6 g( S)−u f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 g( S)
for all S  N.
Now suppose that (N;w) 2 CDGN is a capital dependent deposit game such that

































































So, with the capital !1
^ t + !2
^ t + !3
^ t + !4
^ t coalition f1;2;3;4g can generate a strictly positive
revenue in time period ^ t.F r o mw ( f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 5 g )=0it then follows that !1
^ t + !2
^ t + !3
^ t + !5
^ t <
!1
^ t + !2
^ t + !3
^ t + !4
^ t. For suppose this is not the case. Then by making the same deposit
as coalition f1;2;3;4g does in period ^ t, coalition f1;2;3;5g can generate a strictly positive
revenue in time period ^ t, which contradicts w(f1;2;3;5g)=0 .S o , ! 5
^ t<! 4
^ t. Similarly,
w(f1;2;3;6g)=0 ,w ( f 1 ;2 ;4 ;5 g )=0 ,a n dw ( f 1 ;2 ;4 ;6 g )=0imply that !6
^ t <! 4
^ t,! 5
^ t <! 3
^ t,
and !6
^ t <! 3





































^ tg < minf!3
^ t;! 4
^ tg and maxf!3
~ t;! 4
~ tg < minf!5
~ t;! 6
~ tg cannot hold





























































































































































= w(f1;2;3;4g)+w ( f 1 ;2 ;5 ;6 g )
=2 ;
which contradicts w(f1;2;3;4;5;6g)=1 . Conclusion, the game (N;v) cannot be written as
a capital dependent deposit game.
Note that the game (N;v) of the previous example does have a population monotonic




2; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0). Then the allocation scheme fxSgSN
deﬁned by xS
i = i for all i 2 S and all S  N is population monotonic. Furthermore,
note that this game is not a positive linear combination of unanimity games, for v(S)=
u f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 g ( S )+u f 1 ; 2 ; 5 ; 6 g( S)−u f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 g( S)for all S  N. The following proposition shows
that each positive linear combination of unanimity games is a capital dependent deposit game.
Proposition 4.3 The nonnegative cone of unanimity games fuSjS  Ng is contained in the
class CDGN of capital dependent deposit games.
The reverse of Proposition 4.3, however, is not true. The next example provides a game
that is not a positive combination of unanimity games but that can be written as a capital
dependent deposit game.
Example 4.4 Let (N;v) 2 GN be a three-person game with v(S)=u f 1 ; 2 g( S )+u f 1 ; 3 g( S)−
u f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g( S)for all S  N. Deﬁne a capital dependent deposit game (N;w) 2 CDGN with
 =1and R(d)=1if d  3 and R(d)=0otherwise. Furthermore, let !1
1 =2 ,! 2
1 =1 ,
and !3
1 =1 .S i n c e
P
i 2 S! i
13 if and only if S 2f f 1 ; 2 g ; f 1 ; 3 g ; f 1 ; 2 ; 3 gg,w eh a v et h a t
w ( S )=1if and only if S 2f f 1 ;2 g ;f 1 ;3 g ;f 1 ;2 ;3 gg. Thus, w(S)=v ( S )for all S  N.
125 Fixed Term Deposit Games
Forthethirdandﬁnalsubclassweconsiderthesituationinwhichadepositonlyyieldsastrictly
positive revenue if the term covers all  periods. Mathematically, this means that R(ceT)=0
if T 6= f1;2;:::;g. The class of all ﬁxed term deposit games with agent set N is denoted
by FDG N. In fact, we have already seen this type of deposit games in the proof of Theorem
3.2. To show that each nonnegative totally balanced game is a term dependent deposit game,
we constructed a deposit game in which deposits only earn a strictly positive revenue if they
cover the whole time span of  periods. Thus, the following result immediately follows from
the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 5.1 Each nonnegative totally balanced game is a ﬁxed term deposit game.
According to Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 the class of term dependent deposit games
is equal to the class of nonnegative totally balanced games. Theorem 5.1 then implies
Theorem 5.2 Every term dependent deposit game is a ﬁxed term deposit game.
Although ﬁxed term deposit games exhaust the class of nonnegative totally balanced
games, they are not totally balanced in general. Example 2.1 is an example of a ﬁxed term
deposit game with an empty core. We can, however, derive a sufﬁcient condition for totally
balancedness similar to the one for capital dependent deposit games.
Theorem 5.3 Let T = f1;2;:::;g.I f
R ( ceT)
c is increasing in c on (0;1) then the ﬁxed term
deposit game (N;v) is totally balanced.
In order to show that ﬁxed term deposit games are balanced, an allocation rule that
belongs to the core is constructed. For deﬁning this rule, let (N;v) be a ﬁxed term deposit
game. Next, consider the game (N;w) with w(S)=m i n t 2 T! t( S )for all S  N. Here, w(S)
represents the amount of money coalition S can invest with term f1;2;:::;g.I ti ss h o w ni n
K ALAI AND ZEMEL (1982) that a non-negative cooperative game is totally balanced iff it is a
13minimum of a ﬁnite collection of additive games. Therefore,(N;w) is totally balanced so that
there exists a core-allocation x 2 IR
N . A core-allocation for the game (N;v) is then found by
allocating v(N) proportionally with respect to x to the investors. This means that, as long as




v ( N) :
Otherwise, v(N)=x ( N )=0 , and all investors receive i(x)=0 . Since this allocation rule
depends on a core-allocation x of the game (N;w), we can obtain several proportional-like
allocation rules by specifying the allocation x. For instance, by taking x to be the nucleolus
n(w) (see SCHMEIDLER (1969)) of the game (N;w), we obtainthe allocation (n(w)) 2 C(v).
Alternatively, since (N;w) can be interpreted as a ﬂow game, a minimum cut solution mc(w)
(see KALAI and ZEMEL (1982)) also results in an allocation (mc(w)) 2 C(v).
14A Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1: Let (N;v) 2 TDG N. We ﬁrst show that (N;v) is balanced. For
this we use the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for balancedness by BONDAREVA (1963) and
SHAPLEY (1967).
Take  :2 N !IR + such that
P





































































































































































deposit game, it follows that (N;vjS) is balanced. Hence, term dependent deposit games are
totally balanced.
2
In the sequel we will use the following result, which is due to KALAI AND ZEMEL (1982).
Theorem A.1 A non-negative cooperative game is totally balanced if and only if it is the
15minimum of a ﬁnite collection of additive games.
PROOF OFTHEOREM 3.2: The ‘if’-partfollowsfromTheorem 3.1. For the‘onlyif’-partwe use
the result of KALAI and ZEMEL (1982) provided in Theorem A.1. So, take (N;v) 2 TOBA N
+
and let (N;a1);(N;a2);:::;(N;aq)bethe ﬁnitecollectionof additivegamessuch that v(S)=
minfak(S)jk 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;qgg for all S  N. We construct a term dependent deposit game
(N;w) 2 TDG N such that w(S)=v ( S )for all S  N.
Take  = q and deﬁne R(d)=m i n f d tj t2f 1 ;2 ;:::;gg. So, we have q time periods
and a deposit only yields a positive reward if the term equals exactly q time periods. Next,
deﬁne !i
































































ef1;2;:::;g. Then d is a feasible deposit for coalition
S, hence
w(S)  R(d)= m i n
t 2f1;2;:::;qg
!t(S)= m i n
t 2f1;2;:::;qg
at(S)=v ( S ) :
Consequently, w(S)=v ( S ) .
2
P ROOF OF THEOREM 4.1: Since each subgame is also a capital dependent deposit game, we
only need to show that a capital dependent deposit game is balanced. To prove nonemptiness
of the core we explicitly construct a core-allocation. First we derive some preliminary results.
16Let t 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;gand let c1;c 2>0.S i n c e
R ( cet)
c is increasing in c it follows that
R(c1et)+R ( c 2e t)=c 1
R ( c 1 e t )
c 1
+ c 2
R ( c 2 e t )
c 2
 c 1





= R((c1 + c2)et): (4)
This implies that in each period one should make only one deposit and make it as high as
possible.
Take (N;v) 2 CDGN and recall that R(ceT)=
P
t 2 TR ( cet) for all T 2Tand all























































where the last two equalities follow from (4), that is invest in one deposit only. In particular






Now, weconstruct a core-allocationfor thegame (N;v). For each periodt wedividethe
rewardR(!t(S)) proportional to the contribution !i




















































where the inequality follows from the fact that
R(cet)
c is increasing in c for all t 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;g.
Since the inequality is an equality for S = N, it follows that (v) 2 C(v).
2
PROOFOFPROPOSITION4.3: Let(N;v) 2 GN beanonnegativelinearcombinationofunanimity
games, that is, there exists cT  0, T  N such that for each S  N it holds that v(S)=
P
T Nc Tu T( S ) . Weconstructagame(N;w) 2 CDGN such that w(S)=v ( S )forallS  N.
Take the number of time periods equal to  =2 N−1and make a one-to-onecorrespon-
dence between the time periods and all the non-empty coalitions. More precisely, let St  N





c S t ,i fcc S t
0 ,i fc<c S t:
(7)
Furthermore, take !i
t =( # S t ) − 1 c S t if i 2 St and !i
t =0if i 62 St. Here, #St denotes the
number of agents in coalition St. Then
w(S)=
























cSt if and only if St  S.
2
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3: Since each subgame is also a ﬁxed term deposit game, we only need
to show that a ﬁxed term deposit game is balanced.
Let T = f1;2;:::;gand take c1;c 2 >0.S i n c e
R ( ceT)
c is nondecreasing in c expression
(4) holds, that is
R(c1eT)+R ( c 2e T)R ((c1 + c2)eT):
Hence, one should make only one deposit with term T and make it as high as possible.












































where the third and fourth equality follows from (A). In particular we have that v(N)=
R (mint2T !t(N)).
If v(N)=0then v(S)=0for all S  N and 0 2 C(v). Let us assume that v(N) > 0.
So, mint2T !t(N) > 0. Deﬁne a cooperative game (N;w) with w(S)=m i n t 2 T! t ( S )
for all S  N. Note that (N;w) is the minimum of a ﬁnite collection of additive games
(N;a1);(N;a2);:::;(N;a),w h e r ea t( S )=! t( S )=
P
i 2 S! i
tfor all S  N and all t 2 T.
Hence, (N;w) is totally balanced by Theorem A.1.
Let x 2 IR
N be a core-allocation of the game (N;w). Thus, for each S  N it holds
true that
P










19We show that  is a core-allocation of (N;v). Therefore, take S  N.I f mint2T !t(S)=0
then
P






























where the ﬁrst inequality follows from x 2 C(w) and the second inequality follows from the
fact that
R(ceT)
c is nondecreasing inc. Sincebothinequalities areequalitiesfor S = N,w eh a v e
that  2 C(v).
2
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